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he past year marked the rise of cybersecurity as the ‘number one concern’ for major 
economies,  and  monopolised  the  spotlight  in  recent  talks  between  G2  Presidents 
Obama and Xi Jinping. Reports show that cyberattacks can easily target personally 
identifiable  data,  such  as  credit  cards  or  healthcare  information  –  as  easily  as  the  US 
Department of Justice or Iranian Nuclear facilities. Cyber threat is rising just as the Internet 
becomes a critical infrastructure for the global economy, with hundreds of new functions 
migrating to the network, and thousands more waiting to be hosted on cloud platforms, 
remote  storage  centres,  smart  grid  management  systems  and  machine-to-machine 
communication.  Between  April  and  December  2012,  the  types  of  threats  detected  on  the 
Google Android platform increased by more than 30 times from 11,000 to 350,000, and are 
expected  to  reach  one  million  in  2003,  according  to  security  company  Trend  Micro  (see 
Figure 1). Put simply, as the global economy relies more on the Internet, the latter becomes 
increasingly insidious. It is efficient, no doubt: but is it also secure? 
Figure 1. Threats detected on Android platforms, March-December 2012 
 
Source: Trend Micro (2013). 
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The rise of the digital cold war 
What’s more, cyber-threats and cyber-attacks also hide an escalating ‘digital cold war’. The 
United States has long been denouncing that the bulk of cyber-attacks that hit its institutions 
and  companies  every  day  are  state-sponsored,  and  mostly  China-sponsored  or  Iran-
sponsored. Attacks are taking all forms, including massive penetration of the US market by 
cheap, often state-subsidised tech giants such as Huawei or Lenovo: the US imports almost 
$130 billion of high-tech products from China every year.1 A recent, controversial report by 
security firm Mandiant documents the cyber-espionage campaigns conducted in recent years 
by a hacker group known as the ‘Comment Crew’ against more than 100 companies and 
organisations  from  different  industries  (the most  attacked  being  IT),  and  observes  that  a 
secret Chinese military unit based in Shanghai was the most likely driving force behind a 
series of hacking attacks on the US. Not surprisingly, the new US spending law passed by 
Congress on 27 March 2013 prohibits any form of procurement of Chinese hardware in US 
institutions such as NASA, the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce, 
unless a thorough assessment of “cyber-espionage or sabotage” risk by specialised federal 
officials has been carried out. Such assessment must include "any risk associated with such 
system being produced, manufactured or assembled by one or more entities that are owned, 
directed or subsidized" by China. Tensions between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping over the 
rise of cyber-espionage has reached a peak in the past weeks: the US president has publicly 
stated that several attacks that have recently hit large banks, institutions and companies were 
“state sponsored”, and made direct reference to China. On the other hand, Chinese experts 
claim to be the main target of state-sponsored attacks, mostly coming from the US. Table 1 
shows that Russia and Germany have been the most frequent sources of cyber-attacks in 
March 2013, followed by Taiwan and the United States.  
Table 1. Source, number and type of attacks, March 2013 
 
Source: Deutsche Telekom Cyber initiative. 
                                                   
1 See W.M. Morrison (2012), “China-US trade issues”, Congressional Research Service Report, 22 May 
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What’s happening to the Internet? 
Originally created as a ‘dumb’ network, with intelligence distributed at the edges rather than 
at the centre, the Internet has always been a difficult place  for policy-makers wishing to 
enforce the laws of the ‘real world’. Already in the late 1990s, Carol Rose defined it as like 
“Central Park after dark”, a place of both excitement and danger. And some authors did not 
hesitate to declare that some laws, including copyright, had no future in the Internet. The 
infancy of the Web saw the prevalence of freedom and neutrality over law enforcement and 
traffic filtering: law authorities have been chasing ‘techies’ and ‘hackers’for years, but never 
gave  the  impression  to  be  winning  the  war.  The  threat  of  Distributed  Denial  of  Service 
(DDoS) attacks became a reality as early as 2001, when post-bubble IT companies such as 
Amazon, eBay, Yahoo! were severely hit. So, this is nothing new: the problem is that the 
stakes  are  becoming  higher,  as  the  Internet  and,  more  generally,  the  IT  environment 
increasingly  permeates  our  lives.  Already  in  2004,  the  British  Columbia  Institute  of 
Technology reported a ten-fold increase since 2000 in malicious attacks on process control 
systems,  affecting  critical  services  such  as  power  utilities,  sewage  systems  and  wireless 
networks. In a few years from now, we will likely delegate to the IT infrastructure almost 
everything, from electricity consumption to tax declaration, and almost everything we do at 
work.  Suffice  it  to  think  about  ‘smart  cities’  and  ‘machine-to-machine  communications’, 
which  will  lead  to  interconnecting  everything  from  buildings  to  trains,  dishwashers  and 
smartphones, all governed by a conundrum of hardware and software located somewhere in 
a cloud. And what’s more, in cyberspace, attack seems to always have a structural lead over 
defence,  given  that  it  is  sometimes  prohibitively  difficult  to  foresee  where,  how,  when 
attackers will launch their threat. Modern botnets apparently guarantee the result: within a 
given timeframe, any target can be attacked and damaged.  
This  is  why  our  global  community  faces  a  tragic  dilemma  today.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
neutrality of the Internet has proven to be a formidable ally of democracy and freedom: 
suffice it to think about the role of social networks during the Arab uprisings, or the work of 
bloggers such as Sana Saleem or Yoani Sanchez in otherwise heavily filtered countries (in 
their case, Pakistan and Cuba). This means that allowing too much traffic filtering might 
mean killing freedom of expression, by means of killing the end-to-end architecture that has 
made cyberspace an unprecedented forum for democracy. On the other hand, the cost of 
preserving  users’  freedom  is  skyrocketing  every  day:  the  US  seems  ready  to  abandon 
established privacy rights in the name of enhanced security, and the recent PRISM scandal 
confirms  this  sweeping  impression.  Key  services  such  as  e-commerce,  e-health,  e-
government, M2M and tele-work might never take off if users aren’t able to operate in a 
more trusted environment. And to be sure, some governments simply do not like ideas to 
circulate freely. A recent report by The Economist has shed light on the enormous amount of 
resources China is devoting to building a “giant cage”, i.e. a domestic version of the Internet 
that allows for certain freedom to end users (such as opening microblogs), but with heavy 
automatic and even manual filtering of content by an army of civil servants. Countries like 
Pakistan  and  Kazakhstan  have  created  huge  national  firewalls  to  ensure  that  people  are 
limited  in  their  behaviour.  Recently  elected  Venezuelan  president  Maduro  reportedly 
switched off the Internet for a few hours the day of the elections, to avoid easy reporting of 
illegal counting of votes. But even Mr. Obama has been given a new button to switch off the 
Internet back in 2009.  
The question becomes more urgent every day: should the Internet remain an end-to-end, 
neutral  environment,  or  should  we  sacrifice  Internet  freedom  on  the  altar  of  enhanced 4 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
security? The answer to this question requires a brief explanation of how the Internet is 
governed today, and what might change in the future.  
The end of the Web as we know it? 
Since  its  early  days,  the  Internet  has  been  left  largely  unregulated  by  public  authorities 
(starting with the US 1996 Telecommunications Act), becoming a matter for private, self-
regulation by engineers and experts, who have for years taken key decisions about Internet 
governance through rather unstructured procedures. No doubt, this has worked in the first 
years. As cyberspace started to boom, the stakes started to rise: rather informal bodies such 
as  ICANN,  a  private  multi-stakeholder  association  benevolently  supervised  by  the  US 
government  that  rules  on  domain  names  and  other,  key  aspects  of  the  Internet,  were 
increasingly challenged due to their partial independence of governments. Recent decisions 
by ICANN, such as a massive liberalization of top-level domain names and the creation of 
the  .xxx  extension  for  pornography,  have  accelerated  and  exacerbated  the  debate  over 
increased  government  involvement  in  the  governance  of  the  Internet,  either  through  a 
dedicated  UN  agency,  or  through  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU),  an 
existing UN body in charge of ensuring international interconnection and facilitating the 
deployment of telecom infrastructure, and thus so far completely alien to the Internet world. 
Prominent individuals such as FCC Commissioner McDowell have made it clear that, should 
the multi-stakeholder model be abandoned, this would mean the end of the (free) Web as we 
know it.2  
Not surprisingly, as the International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR) Treaty had to 
be  re-discussed  at  the  end  of  last  year  in  the  World  Conference  on  International 
Telecommunications (WCIT), held in Dubai, the debate reached unprecedented peaks. Every 
stakeholder was looking for a different outcome: the ITU wished to expand its remit over the 
Internet,  European  Telecom  operators  wanted  to  secure  more  revenues  by  changing 
interconnection rules, China, Russia and India wanted stronger government control over the 
Internet architecture and content and many in the US and Europe stood to protect the multi-
stakeholder model that made ICANN at once a very effective and increasingly controversial 
regulator. The confusion became chaos when a number of Africa, Middle East and Asian 
countries sought the inclusion of the declaration of Internet access as a fundamental human 
right in the new ITRs. When all this was finally translated into a proposed new ITR treaty, as 
many  as  55  countries  (including  the  US,  Canada,  Australia,  the  UK  and many  other  EU 
countries) decided not to sign. Since then, the question is unresolved, and unlikely to be 
successfully addressed during 2013.  
Where do we go from here? 
It is highly unlikely that the many problems that affect cyberspace today can be solved in one 
go. There are at least three aspects that deserve separate, international agreement: cyber-
security, Internet governance and freedom of expression. Attempting to mix and match these 
three issues inevitably means failure. Conversely, solutions exist in all three domains, which 
would also preserve the consistency of the overall picture.  
First,  cybersecurity  needs  a global  public-private  partnership  which  entails  the  following 
steps: 
•  Countries should establish generic commitments to take action to fight botnets and 
refrain from engaging in government-sponsored cyberattacks.  
                                                   
2  See  “The  UN  Threat  to  Internet  Freedom”,  Wall  Street  Journal,  21  February  2012 
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•  All governments should set up Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERT) that 
receive notification from private parties and secure network resilience either directly 
(when they own the networks) or indirectly by remunerating network operators for 
their investments in network upgrade and security – something that seldom happens 
in telecom regulation today. 
•  Private  operators  should  agree  on  industry-wide  codes  of  conduct  at  regional  and 
possibly  global  level  to  ensure  that  the  flow  of  information  between  operators  and 
public authorities is as fast and reliable as possible. 
•  Trust must be established between public and private operators through a dedicated 
platform, such as the European Public Private Partnership for Resilience (E3PR).  
•  A taxonomy and classification of major risks and available counter-strategies should be 
developed: this, in turn, would enable the development of a more mature insurance 
market for cybersecurity. 
Second,  there  is  no  credible  alternative  to  the  multi-stakeholder  model  for  Internet 
governance.  But  the  United  Stated  should  realise  that  key  Internet  assets  should  not  be 
controlled only by US companies as is currently the case: while more than half of Internet 
users are located in Asia, the US still keep exclusivity over the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) and the root zone file of the Internet. At a minimum, non-US companies, 
including EU-based ones, should be allowed to compete to become the managers of these 
critical  resources.  More  generally,  ICANN  should  become  more  transparent,  structured, 
accountable and truly multi-stakeholder if it wants to survive as a private regulator: all eyes 
are on ICANN’s procedures, and they cannot rely anymore on ‘rough consensus’ among 
Internet gurus and engineers.  
Third,  the  global  community  should  agree  on  principles  and  rights  on  Internet  usage, 
including the need to guarantee that, whatever managed services run over the IP protocol, 
end  users  have  at  least  a  part  of  the  Internet  in  which  neutrality  and  the  end-to-end 
architecture  are  preserved.  This  will  be  heavily  resisted  since  it  could  lead  to  easier 
anonymity for criminals: but any alternative would mean killing democracy. This, in turn, 
means  that  the  Web  will  increasingly  look  like  a  two-track  world:  the  basic,  end-to-end 
Internet, which should be protected for freedom of expression purposes; and managed cloud 
services, which will include many of the new features of IT-enabled economies, from smart 
transport  to  home  automation  and  will  feature  enhanced  levels  of  security  and  privacy 
through trusted traffic filtering.  